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Abstract--Management of Power Quality (PQ) suffers more 
pressure from economy and social equity, it is necessary to 
control electromagnetic pollution emitted from both electric 
utilities and customers. Calculation of optimal Emission Right 
(ER) gross and its distribution is an important content of 
controlling electromagnetic pollution, and it should be worked 
out based on cooperative game. This paper analyses game actions 
among all members in one Point of Common Connection (PCC) 
for pursuing ER and high PQ, and clarifies the highest price of 
ER and PQ service that is acceptable for gamers. This paper 
adopts uniform price sealed auction model to make gamers take 
the acceptable highest price of ER and PQ service as their 
bidding price, and PQ Supervision Department (PQSD) can 
make full use of their information from auction, then the 
calculated ER gross can satisfy Pareto optimality. That gross can 
maximize social integrative benefits. This auction model also 
proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for the optimal distribution 
of ER among all gamers. This equilibrium can optimize 
distribution of social and electromagnetic resource. Examples 
indicate that the proposed model for optimal gross and 
distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective. 
 
Index Terms--Power quality; electricity market; power quality 
market; game theory 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
LECTRICAL loads trend to diversity and complexity. So 
much nonlinear, impactive and unbalanced loads 
deteriorate power quality of network. At the same time, lots of 
computer systems, robots and high-tech industries require 
higher and higher Power Quality (PQ). Approximately 
estimated by EPRI in 2000, economic loss relating to PQ is 26 
billion dollar per year in USA [1]. Conflicts caused by Power 
Quality (PQ) are deepening increasingly. An important reason 
is that electromagnetic pollution has external cost, that means 
some one emits electromagnetic pollution (conductive) into 
one Point of Common Connection (PCC), then all customers 
connected into this PCC will suffer economic losses from it. 
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Now there is lack for incentives to decision-makers 
considering the impacts caused by electromagnetic pollution 
when they make decisions. Like other natural environment, 
electromagnetic environment is also public property. PQ 
management suffers pressure from economy and social equity 
requirements. According to “environmental economics” [2], it 
is necessary to control electromagnetic pollution from both 
electric utilities and customers. 
To control electromagnetic pollution includes three parts: 
restricting pollution gross, optimizing distribution of Emission 
Right (ER) and charging for pollution. Restricting pollution 
gross means to maintain PCC on optimal polluted level where 
the sum of loss caused by PQ disturbances, mitigation cost for 
PQ disturbances and improvement cost for higher PQ in the 
whole PCC is the least. Optimizing distribution of ER is to 
make full use of electromagnetic environment directly, and 
indirectly induce optimal investment for mitigating PQ 
disturbances. Charging for pollution is to transfer external 
cost to interior. It bases on ER quantity that means someone 
with more ER should pay more while others with less ER can 
pay less. That is equitable and can create incentives for 
decision-makers to consider external cost of pollution. 
Optimal gross and distribution of ER both vary with loads 
and networks. They should be worked out through optimal 
programming method. Therefore, the information about 
electric characters, the economic losses caused by PQ 
disturbances, the mitigation and improvement efficiency of 
electric utility and customers needs to be collected. It is 
infeasible without PQ Supervision Department (PQSD). 
Administrative way alone in market may be ineffective and 
may cause corruption easily. Cooperative game means many 
players ally a coalition, and shoot for utmost profit of this 
coalition, after that they will distribute the profit inside 
through game [3]-[4]. It is just fit for researching optimal 
gross and distribution of ER. That ensures the study on 
market policy and market players’ action accords with actual 
cases. 
II.  GAME ANALYSIS TO ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT 
Suppose there are n rational players in a certain PCC, they 
emit electromagnetic pollution when they operate normally, at 
the same time they maybe need to improve PQ reasonably to 
ensure normal production. Electromagnetic environment of 
this PCC is public resource for all players. However, everyone 
would like to enjoy favorable PQ and not willing to bear the 
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obligation of protecting electromagnetic environment. 
Everyone attempts to maximize its benefit through correct 
game strategy. 
A.  Basic Assumptions 
All actions of players are classified into two types of 
independent game process named as “applying for ER” and 
“applying for PQ service”. Considering customers emitting 
electromagnetic pollution as electric current sources (except 
reactive current), whose output impedances are diverse, 
polluting ability to PCC of various customers is different. 
Therefore, absolute polluting current needs to be amended. A 
polluting ability coefficient, named F, is introduced, whose 
value is reciprocal of polluting current that cause PCC unit 
voltage distortion. For example, 10A 3rd harmonic current of a 
certain customer causes 1V 3rd harmonic voltage of PCC, so 
this customer’s polluting ability coefficient of 3rd harmonic 
current Fh3=0.1; if 5A negative-sequence current causes 1V 
negative-sequence voltage of PCC, then this customer’s 
coefficient of negative-sequence current Fneg=0.2; if surge 
current whose amplitude is 5A causes sag of PCC whose drop 
of voltage is 1V, its coefficient of surge current Fs=0.2. The 
rest may be deduced similarly, all customers’ absolute 
polluting current can be standardized into relative polluting 
current based on polluting ability to PCC, whose unit is 
defined as A˜, so there is a uniform criterion to appraise 
polluting current of customer. 
Variables xi, yi ∈[0, +∞](i=1, 2, L, n) are introduced, 
where xi means the emitted pollution quantity of player i, yi 
means the pollution quantity margin that player i feels less 
than the pollution gross in PCC, to take improving action or 
buy PQ service. All xi and yi have been united by polluting 
ability coefficient F. For example, absolute polluting current 
of player i is 50A, and its polluting ability coefficient F=0.1, 
so its pollution quantity xi=5A˜. ∑
=
=
n
i
ixX
1
 means the pollution 
gross of all players. Suppose any player will not influence 
others by their improvement for higher PQ. Electromagnetic 
environment has its capability to endure pollution, and it will 
be drastically damaged if pollution exceeds its limit. Then 
power system cannot run normally, and players cannot 
operate either. So there is a maximal capacity Xmax. 
B.  Nash Equilibrium of Game [5]-[7] 
There are five kinds of ER: harmonic ER, unbalanced 
current ER, surge current ER, fluctuant ＆ flickering current 
ER and reactive current ER [8,9]. In the game of “applying 
for ER”, if pollution gross X* is given, players need to 
compete for it. Every player should decide how much ER xi* (xi* 
>0) be bought and how much bid-price pi* be provided to 
maximize its benefit. For X* is given, game result makes no 
difference to any players’ loss caused by PQ disturbance. The 
benefit created by ER to players is described as follows 
[ ] ),,2,1()(),,,,( 1 nipxvxxxxH iiiinii LLL =−=  (1) 
where pi means unit price of ER in practice, vi(xi) means 
average expense saved for player i through emitting unit 
pollution. When X<Xmax, v(x)>0; When X≥Xmax, v(x)=0 (this 
means electromagnetic environment has been polluted so 
badly that players can not work any longer). All players 
require ER create benefit for them, so 
pi <vi(xi) (2) 
Equation (2) means that maximal unit price of ER pervious 
to players is average expense saved from emitting unit 
pollution. 
To one player, variation of v caused by additional unit 
pollution is so little that can be neglected. However, to 
dissimilar player, v is different due to technique and 
production efficiency. So there is 
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Equation (3) means that vi(xi) is constant to a certain player. 
As long as (2) is satisfied, more ER can create more benefits. 
Furthermore, any players’ victory or defeat in game is not 
decided by ER quantity they bid. So ER-quantity xi*  bidding by 
all players should be their maximal polluting capability, and 
bid-price pi* should be decided by their mitigating efficiency, 
independent of xi*. 
Pollution gross is limited, so higher unit bid-price pi* will 
be helpful to win game, and lower will lose chance of winning 
game. The strategies adopted by players are decided by the 
gaming mode PQSD adopted. 
In the game of “applying for PQ service”, function ci(X) is 
introduced, that means additional production cost added to 
player i by additional unit pollution when gross is X in PCC 
(worse PQ deteriorates work environment, then economic loss 
rises, production eligibility rate declines, and production 
efficiency drops, so production cost increases.). If pollution 
gross X* is given, every player should decide how much PQ 
service yi* be bought and how much bid-price qi* be provided to 
maximize its benefit. The benefit created by PQ service is 
computed as following 
),,2,1()()(
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Equation (4) indicates that improving PQ has two opposite 
effects. One is PQ improvement can drop production-cost, 
and the other is it will cost yiqi or have to equip improving 
devices, such as DVR, UPQC and so on. General speaking, to 
improve PQ separately is very expensive. Therefore, the value 
of PQ service is dispersion of reduced production cost 
subtracting PQ service expense. 
If pollution gross X* is given, what is the maximal unit 
price of PQ service pervious to a player with PQ service yi*? 
Derivative of function Mi(yi) means the benefit created by unit 
PQ service when pollution gross is X*, 
iiiii qyXcyM −−=∂∂ )(/ *  (5) 
Equation (5) indicates that the benefit created by unit PQ 
service varies with yi. The reason is PQ felt by players rises 
when they accept PQ service, so marginal production cost 
reduced by unit PQ service varies. When PCC polluted level 
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is low, c of all players caused by additional unit pollution will 
increase and some may be sharply; after pollution gross 
reaches Xc, c will drop down with X increasing, and different 
player has different Xc; when X<Xmax, c(X)>0; when X≥Xmax, 
c(X)=0. So, it is described as following 
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Equation (6) indicates that c(X) is a parabola adown, 
instead of monotonic function. When pollution gross is X*, PQ 
service may increase or drop c(X*) for dissimilar players. 
Exclusive criterion for customers to buy PQ service with 
quantity yi* is that should create benefit. PQ service price is 
constant provided by Power Quality Service Company 
(PQSC), while c(X*-y) varies, so customers can’t ensure each 
parts of PQ service they bought can create benefit for them. 
But they can assure their marginal PQ service create benefit, 
that is: 
)(0)( ** iiiiii yXcqqyXc −<⇒>−−  (7) 
Equation (7) means that the maximal unit price of PQ 
service with quantity yi pervious to a player must be less than 
production cost reduced by marginal unit PQ service. If unit 
price of PQ service is higher than ci(X*-yi), customer will cut 
down PQ service quantity. 
Suppose player i buys PQ service yi*=1A˜ when pollution 
gross X*=100A˜. The maximal unit price of PQ service 
pervious to player i is ci(100) obviously. 
If player i changes its mind, and want to buy yi*=10A˜, the 
benefit created by PQ service is 
iiiiii qdyycyM 10)100()(
10
0
−−= ∫  (8) 
If player i pays ci(100) as unit price qi for PQ service, 
substituting it into (8) and applying intermediate value 
theorem yields 
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where λ is a value within [0, 10]. Equation (6) and (9) indicate 
that the production cost reduced by PQ service yi*=10A˜ may be 
less than what has paid for that. To buy PQ service like that 
sustains losses in business, nobody will do. 
Analysis has indicates that bid-price qi* for PQ service is 
associated with its quantity yi* to be applied. In a PCC with 
pollution gross X*, for player i, 0<X*<Xc comes into existence, 
if player i wants to increase its quantity yi* of PQ service, its 
bid-price qi* must be knocked down, then it will lose the 
chance of winning game. On the contrary, application of less 
PQ service will have more chance to win. The strategies 
adopted by players are decided by the gaming mode PQSD 
adopted. 
If considering the two games independently, all the ER and 
PQ service can be sold, and Nash equilibrium of games can be 
actualized, as long as unit price of ER or pollution gross X* of 
PCC is given. 
C.  Pareto Optimality of Game [10]-[11] 
Let V(X) be the marginal expense saved for PCC through 
emitting unit pollution when pollution gross is X. With gross 
increasing, number of players emitting pollution grows, but 
marginal expense saved through emitting unit pollution drops 
leapingly. It is described as following 
V(X*)=min[v(x)]=vi(xi*)    [xi*>0, i∈(1, 2, …,n)] (10) 
Player i is called as the marginal pollution source when 
pollution gross is X*. 
Let C(X) be the marginal production cost added to PCC by 
additional unit pollution when gross is X in PCC. With gross 
increasing, number of players accepting PQ service grows, so 
the components of C(X) increase constantly, and the value of 
C(X) will alter continuously. It is described as following 
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where q means the unit price of PQ service in practice. 
Based on the optimization condition, the marginal benefit 
must be equal to the marginal cost, optimal pollution gross 
Xopt will satisfy the following equation 
V(Xopt)=C(Xopt) (12) 
If the right side of (12) is less than the left, that means 
electromagnetic environment is not be made the best use. On 
the contrary, that the left side is less than the right means 
mitigation of PCC is not enough. These two conditions both 
depart from Pareto optimization. Without participation of 
PQSD, “non-cooperative game” cannot ensure (12) coming 
into existence, PCC can not run on the most economical 
pollution level, which should be calculated by PQSD based on 
comprehensive information of all players. After that, it will be 
distributed to players through appropriate method. 
To master PQ sensitivity ci in different pollution levels and 
mitigation efficiency vi of all players exactly is the key to 
calculate the optimal pollution gross of PCC. Appropriate ER 
distribution mode will be helpful for PQSD to do that. 
III.  UNIFORM-PRICE SEALED AUCTION GAME MODEL 
Auction is a typical offspring of market economy, and now 
it has become a popular international bargaining means [12]. 
Upwards-price auction, downwards-price auction, uniform-
price (or second-price) auction, different-price auction and 
both sides auction are several modes in common uses. Their 
application ranges and objects are different. 
Because it has high economic efficiency and potential of 
increasing income, the uniform-price auction mode is adopted 
widely. This is a kind of sealed auction. If there is only one 
object, the bidder who provides the highest price will get it 
with the second highest price. So it is also called second-price 
auction mode. If there are multi-objects for auction, second-
price auction turns to uniform-price auction, because all 
successful bargainees will get the objects with same price. 
Some one calls this kind of auction as marginal price auction. 
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In PQM, ER with different quantity will be auctioned at the 
same time, so it belongs to multi-objective auction. 
A.  Analysis to Bidding 
Suppose PQSD want to confirm the optimal pollution gross 
of a certain PCC and distribute ER to all players through 
uniform-price sealed auction. All bidders are required to 
submit requisitions sealed, that include bid information about 
ER quantity xi*, bid-price pi* of unit ER, and bid-price qjk* of 
unit PQ service on different pollution levels Xk. During 
uniform-price sealed auction, all bidders will provide their 
highest estimation for ER and PQ service as their bid-prices. 
Because that only decide whether they can bid successfully, 
not be their actual prices to pay. Debasing bid-price will lose 
the chance of acquiring profit, and bidding up will risk 
sustaining losses in business. So substituting unit bid-price pi* 
and qjk* into (2) and (7), PQ sensitivity ci in different pollution 
levels and mitigation efficiency vi of all players will be clear. 
That provide important data for calculating optimal pollution 
gross of PCC. 
Because unit bid-price qi* for PQ service is restricted by 
corresponding quantity xi* to be applied, on any pollution level 
Xk*, there can be many combination of quantity yik* and 
corresponding qjk*. For convenience, all players are required to 
provide only one combination of unit quantity PQ service and 
corresponding qj* on each pollution level. Finally this 
requisition whose qj* is higher than q provided by Power 
Quality Service Company (PQSC), can create benefit for 
customers (computed based on data provided by customers) 
and corresponding Xk is less than optimal pollution gross Xopt 
can be satisfied. Bargaining-price is q provided by PQSC, and 
bargaining quantity is dispersion of Xopt subtracting Xk where 
qj* exceeds q the first time. In order to improve efficiency of 
PQ service and debase its price, competition must be 
introduced into PQ service, and PQSC must bid for right to 
provide PQ service. The PQSC providing lower price will win, 
this can ensure the price of PQ service in practice close to its 
actual value. 
PQSD researches on the information of all bidders, there 
must be a pollution level Xk* whose marginal pollution source 
can satisfy the following 
∑
=
=
n
i
kij qXcv
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* ]),(min[  (13) 
The left of (13) is the marginal benefit of marginal 
pollution source j, and the right is sum of marginal cost in the 
whole PCC. Equation (13) is equal to (12). 
The optimal pollution gross Xk* of PCC can be worked out 
from (13). Then to find out the prices higher than pj*, the ER 
requisitions corresponding to those prices will success. 
Bargaining-price is the highest bid-price provided by those 
unsuccessful bidders. The result is Nash equilibrium of 
distribution satisfying Pareto optimization 
),,,,( ***1* ni xxxx LL=  (14) 
Because dissimilar players have different PQ sensitivity 
and mitigation efficiency, the value of same ER is diverse to 
them. To those players with low marginal mitigation cost, 
anything will be all right as long as they increase investment a 
little. If the expense of ER is more than their investment in 
mitigation, bidding for ER is unreasonable, it does not accord 
with “rational players” in game. So ER is inessential to them, 
their bid-prices must be low. To those players with high 
marginal mitigation cost, to reduce their pollution by 
themselves maybe very expensive, as long as bidding for ER 
is cheaper than mitigation cost, it is profitable to do it. So ER 
is valuable to them, they can bear high unit price.  
During auction, no bidder knows others how much 
evaluation for ER, so they do not know bid-prices of others. 
This kind of game is an incomplete information game. 
Because all requirements are submitted in seal, the game 
decision of all bidders can be considered at the same time. It 
can be called static game. So this is an incomplete information 
static game, its equilibrium is called Bayes Nash equilibrium. 
B.  Advantages of Uniform-price Sealed Auction 
Uniform-price sealed auction is appropriate to work out 
optimal pollution gross and to distribute ER. There are two 
advantages as following: 
First, uniform-price sealed auction makes PQSD can 
discern comprehensive information of all players. Then they 
will work out an optimal pollution gross close to the most 
economical pollution level of PCC. During uniform-price 
sealed auction, all bidders submit their bid-price pi* of unit ER 
and bid-price qjk* of unit PQ service on different pollution level 
Xk, and all the prices will be their real highest evaluation. 
Equations (2) and (7) indicate that all unit bid-prices pi* and qjk* 
just be mitigation efficiency vi and PQ sensitivity ci on 
different pollution levels of all players. Based on this 
information, PQSD can discern PQ sensitivity of the whole 
PCC easily. Then the optimal pollution gross X* can be 
confirmed that satisfies Pareto optimization condition (12). 
Second, uniform-price sealed auction is more equitable to 
all bargainees, even it can promote development of technique. 
In other auction modes, the bidders who provide higher prices 
will buy ER or PQ service with higher prices. In PQM, it is 
reasonable to buy ER and PQ service without any difference 
with same unit price. It will provide incentives for players to 
improve technique and production efficiency. 
IV.  EXAMPLE 
Following example can testify feasibility to work out 
optimal pollution gross and optimal distribution of ER based 
on game theory. Harmonics is a kind of electromagnetic 
pollution. Suppose game players A, B C, D, E and F are 
connected to one bus, as shown in Fig.1, E and F are PQSC, 
whose function is to improve PQ level for customers. 
Real information of all players is given in Table I, where 
units of imax and xmax are A and A˜, and units of both c and v are 
$/A˜⋅day. For every player is opponent to each other, this 
information is privacy. Information of ER-requisitions offered 
by all players is given in Table II, where data is ER quantity xi* 
and bid-price pi*of unit ER. Supply and demand information of 
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PQ service offered by all players is given in Table III, whose 
unit is $/A˜⋅day. 
 
 
 Player A Player B Player C 
E: PQSC1 Player D F: PQSC2 
 
 
Fig. 1  Six players in game. 
 
 
TABLE I 
REAL INFORMATION OF ALL PLAYERS 
 
 imax Fh xmax v c(50) c(55) c(60) c(65) c(70) c(75) 
A 300 0.1 30 350 10 15 25 35 45 60 
B 200 0.2 40 190 25 40 55 70 90 110 
C 150 0.3 45 140 10 20 30 40 45 50 
D 75 0.4 30 110 15 25 40 60 80 100 
 
TABLE II 
BID-INFORMATION OF APPLYING ER 
 
 A B C D 
xi
*
 (A˜ ) 30 40 45 30 
pi* ($/A˜⋅day) 350 190 140 110 
 
TABLE III 
BID-INFORMATION OF APPLYING AND SUPPLY PQ SERVICE 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 
A 10 15 25 35 45 60 
B 25 40 55 70 90 110 
C 10 20 30 40 45 50 
D 15 25 40 60 80 100 
PQSC1 50 
PQSC2 55 
 
Marginal expense V(X) saved for PCC through emitting 
unit pollution on different pollution levels can be discerned 
according to Table II. It is described as follows 
⎪
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Concluded from Table III, unit price of PQ service 
provided by PQSC1 is lower than PQSC2. All unit prices 
those are provided by requisitions for PQ service and higher 
than the price of PQSC1 should be displaced by 50$/A˜⋅day, as 
shown in Table IV. 
Marginal production cost C(X) added to PCC by additional 
unit pollution on different pollution levels can be discerned 
according to Table IV, as shown in Table V, where its unit is 
$/day. 
 
TABLE IV 
BID-INFORMATION OF PQ SERVICE (AFTER REPLACED) 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 
A 10 15 25 35 45 50 
B 25 40 50 50 50 50 
C 10 20 30 40 45 50 
D 15 25 40 50 50 50 
 
TABLE V 
MARGINAL COST C(X) OF PCC ON DIVERSE POLLUTED LEVEL 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 
C(X) 60 100 145 175 190 200 
 
Comparing Table V and (15), Pareto optimization (13) can 
be satisfied when X=70. That means optimal pollution gross is 
70A˜, A and B get 30A˜ and 40A˜ ER separately, and bargaining 
price is 140$/A˜⋅day. For bid-prices qjk* provided by B and D 
have exceeded bid-price of PQSC1 since X=60 and X=65 
separately, they get 10A˜ and 5A˜ PQ service with price 
50$/A˜⋅day. 
Game result indicates that A and B with the highest 
mitigation cost will get ER, B and D with the most sensitive to 
PQ will get PQ service, and PQSC1 with higher efficiency 
will win the chance to supply PQ service. Alteration of PCC 
integrated benefit when pollution gross is 65A˜, 70A˜ and 75A˜ 
separately is contrasted in Table VI (ER is distributed through 
uniform-price sealed auction). It is computed as following: 
∆L=∆X[V(X)-C(X)] (16) 
 
TABLE VI 
∆L VARYING WITH ∆X IN DIFFERENT X 
 
X(A˜ ) 65 70 75 
∆ X(A) -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 
∆L($/day) +15 -15 0+ 0+ -60 +60 
 
Table VI indicates that additional pollution and mitigation 
both increase economic loss of PCC when pollution gross is 
70A˜. But when pollution gross is 65A˜ or 75A˜, there always 
exist a direction to reduce economic loss for PCC. It testifies 
that cooperative game can maximize social integrated benefits. 
If one player, take A as an example, tries to reduce 
pollution gross through raising his PQ service bid-price, 
which exceeds its real value, as shown in Table VII. 
 
TABLE VII 
BIDDING PRICE PI* OF PLAYER A IS RAISED 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 
pi* 40 50 60 70 80 90 
 
Suppose bidding price pi* of others same to forenamed, so 
the marginal production cost added to PCC by additional unit 
pollution on different pollution levels turns to C’(X), as shown 
in Table VIII, where its unit is $/day. 
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TABLE VIII 
MARGINAL COST C’(X) OF PCC ON DIVERSE POLLUTED LEVELS 
 
 50 55 60 65 70 75 
C’(X) 90 135 170 190 195 200 
 
Comparing Table VIII and (15), the optimal pollution 
gross is 65A˜, less than forenamed, that is intention of A raising 
his PQ service bid-price. There are three aftereffects. Firstly, 
5A˜ ER is reduced from player B, who must pay additional 
(190-140)×5=250$ (according to Table II) to mitigate 
pollution every day, furthermore PCC as a system must pay 
additional 190×5=950$ (according to (15)) to mitigate 
pollution every day. Secondly, production-cost of PCC is 
debased, its value is between 175×5=875$ and 190×5=950$ 
(according to Table V) every day. Thirdly, player A must pay 
50×10=500$ for 10A˜ PQ service. PQ service and pollution 
gross descending can create profit for A approximate to 
(15+45)×(70-55)/2=450$ (according to Table IV) every day. 
Forenamed data indicates that because A raises his PQ service 
bid-price, integrated benefit of PCC descends, and both A and 
B suffer economic loss. Therefore, rational players will not 
take this kind of game strategy. 
By the way, anyone raising ER bid-price also will risk 
economic loss. If player C raises its ER bid-price from 
140$/A˜⋅day to 200$/A˜⋅day, it can get ER with price 190$/A˜⋅day, 
but emitting unit pollution only can save 140$/day for C. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Optimal gross and distribution of ER should be worked out 
through cooperative game. This paper analyses the game of 
striving for ER and favorable PQ among all players in a 
certain PCC. The maximal unit price of ER pervious to 
players is the average expense saved from emitting unit 
pollution, and the maximal unit price of PQ service with 
quantity yi pervious to a player must be less than the 
production cost reduced by marginal unit PQ service. 
Uniform-price sealed auction makes all bidders provide their 
highest evaluation for ER and PQ service as their bid-prices, 
so PQSD can discern comprehensive information of all 
players. Furthermore, the optimal pollution gross worked out 
by PQSD can satisfy Pareto optimality and can maximize 
social integrative benefits. Uniform-price sealed auction is 
appropriate to distribution. The players who have high 
mitigation expense v will get ER with high unit price. The 
players sensitive to PQ can enjoy PQ service with high price. 
Through ER distribution, electromagnetic environment 
resource and PQ investment are optimal distributed. Typical 
example indicates that researching optimal gross and 
distribution of electromagnetic pollution ER based on game 
theory is feasible and effective. 
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